City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

6-2020

Building for Culture: How Municipal Ownership of Cultural
Facilities Influences Annual Arts Funding in American Cities
Adam M. Sachs
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3792
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

BUILDING FOR CULTURE: HOW MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL
FACILITIES INFLUENCES ANNUAL ARTS FUNDING IN AMERICAN CITIES

by

ADAM M. SACHS

A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York.
2020

© 2020
ADAM M. SACHS
All Rights Reserved
ii

Building for Culture: How Municipal Ownership of Cultural Facilities Influences Annual Arts
Funding in American Cities
by
Adam M. Sachs

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in
satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date

John H. Mollenkopf
Thesis Advisor

Date

Alyson Cole
Executive Officer

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
iii

ABSTRACT
Building for Culture: How Municipal Ownership of Cultural Facilities Influences Annual Arts
Funding in American Cities
by
Adam M. Sachs

Advisor: John H. Mollenkopf

This thesis explores how local government support for arts and culture varies across 24
American cities. It has proven to be challenging for researchers to accurately measure municipal
arts support. Research on cultural policy has also often focused on the federal level, despite total
city expenditures far exceeding national or state government support. This thesis attempts to take
an accurate pulse of city expenditures in 2017 and correlates those spending levels to the
variation in city ownership of arts facilities. Rooted in the historical perspectives of the ‘new
institutionalism’ and path-dependency, this paper argues that past decisions about taking
ownership of cultural facilities bind budgetary decision makers in the present; the resulting
relationships, or lack of them, drive the great variation in cultural support in American cities.
Tracing annual funding in the present day to historical decisions made during a city’s foundation
period provides a better understanding of how cities make these budgetary decisions, or perhaps
have them made for them.
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Introduction
Local government funding for arts and culture in the United States far exceeds funding
from state and federal government. Analysists have estimated that local support for the arts is
350% to 800% more than what the federal government supplies through the National
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and 180% to 300% more than the funding provided by state
governments (Cohen 2002). Without question, cities are the key to government support to the
arts in America. Despite this, cultural policy analysis continues to focus on federal policy
(Netzer, 1978; Benedict, 1991; Cherbo and Wyszomirski, 2000).
This research aims to re-focus arts and cultural policy analysis on the local level. It goes
where the money is. American federalism requires that any conclusions about national policy
include consideration of subnational units of governance. With the state and local autonomy
characteristic of American federalism comes variation in state and local policy strategies and
outcomes. Not only do local governments in the aggregate provide the largest amount of arts
funding, but variation is extreme across the United States. New York City can allocate as much
as 190 million dollars to its Department of Cultural Affairs, whereas Boston may provide less
than three million dollars annually, a stark contrast even when controlling for city populations
and overall budgets.
As recently as 1991, city funding was referred to as the “terra incognita of government
support for the arts” and the funds were “yet to be precisely counted” (Cummings Jr. 1991, 77).
This study corrects that oversight and seeks to explain the variation in local government support
for arts and culture in America.

1

Why Do Cities Fund the Arts at Different Levels?
Given that local governments comprise the largest source of public funding for the arts,
why do some spend more than others? Why does New York City fund arts and culture at
relatively large amounts when Boston, another cultural center, does not? How do other cities
compare and how do the similarities and disparities among them provide explanations for those
differences?
The contrast between Boston and New York suggests some answers. The City of New
York owns more than 34 cultural facilities, buildings and properties that are home to dozens of
independently run arts and culture non-profits. While the New York City municipal government
provides these organizations with their physical premises, often rent-free, it also provides annual
operating support to these independently-run institutions (in addition to millions of dollars to
non-city housed cultural organizations). This arrangement has at its origin the American
Museum of Natural History, founded in 1869, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art, founded in
1870. These public-private partnerships provided a template for how museums—and later
performing arts centers, among other cultural organizations—would subsequently be created in
other cities across the county.
Public-private partnerships would be replicated in Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Chicago, and
cities across the county. The local government, in partnership with eminent local private citizens,
would help build and maintain a cultural facility while leaving the management and operating of
the organization to private enterprise. However, such an arrangement between local government
and cultural facilities did not materialize in Boston. To this day, the City of Boston does not own
any of its major cultural facilities and the lack of a stake in the facilities that house the Museum
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of Fine Arts and Boston Symphony Hall, may likely contribute to Boston’s minimal public
spending on arts and culture (Perez, Nelson, and Wiesner 2018, 25). 1
Other major American cities such as Indianapolis and San Antonio also do not own many
cultural facilities. Do those cities also have lower levels of local governmental support for arts
and culture? If so, is there a causal relationship between cultural facility ownership and arts and
culture funding? Did cities that failed to take ownership in the developmental stage of their local
arts and culture environment set themselves on a path of limited engagement in this 31 billion
dollar a year organizational field?2 Likewise, were cities that followed New York City on the
path towards ownership of local facilities in their foundational period institutionally committing
themselves to increased annual support of their local arts and culture organizations?
Describing how such funding decisions are made, economic historian Paul David writes,
“a fundamental condition, which appears to underlie all of the instances in which economic
resource allocation processes exhibit path dependent dynamics, is presence of micro-level
irreversibilities—as in branching systems where a path forks into several tracks that remain
separated and un-retraceable” (David 2007, 101). This research aims to trace whether and how
those irreversibilities came about and to achieve a better understanding of how public funds are
allocated to arts and culture.

1

The City of Boston does own and operate the Strand Theatre although its does not receive much use and
therefore it is not considered a major cultural facility (Kurkjian and Tarantino 2010).
2
In 2015 the National Center for Arts Research measured the combined total annual budgets for nonprofit
arts and cultural organizations with annual budgets above $50,000. Their survey of 39,292 organizations
estimated the combined total budget size to be $31,739,398,686 with an estimated total employee figure
of 908,175 (Z. Voss & G. B. Voss, 2017).
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Existing Research on Arts and Culture Funding and Policy
Observers frequently attribute the emergence of local arts agencies (LAAs) across the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s to the passing of the National Foundation on the Arts and
the Humanities Act of 1965, which established federal funding for the arts by creating the
National Endowment of the Arts (NEA) and National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH).
This first American federal arts policy established an intergovernmental network of federal,
regional, state, and local agencies (Mulcahy and Wyszomirski, 1995). What this narrative may
overlook is the prior existence of a great deal of local government funding for arts and culture
funding.
Cities like New York and Philadelphia had been funding and supporting museums, zoos,
and botanic gardens at relatively significant levels since the nineteenth-century. In many cases,
local city governments helped to construct and maintain the buildings that house these facilities.
Such public-private partnerships continued to spring up into the twentieth-century, as cities
helped to develop performing arts institutions and other forms of cultural activity.
Cities across the county may have made a strategic decision to coalesce disparate forms
of cultural funding support into a single agency by founding LAAs, which also made
coordination with state and federal agencies easier. But if researchers mistakenly look at the
creation of the NEA and LAAs as the start of American cultural policy, they overlook a
significant part of the story.
Early twentieth-century cultural policy analysis often compared the deficiencies of the
United States to European cases (Overmyer, 1939). Indeed, given the absence of a national
cultural policy for much of the first 200 years of American history, this type of comparison was
illuminating and necessary. As the NEA and federal arts policy emerged in the latter half of the
4

twentieth-century, so did the study of how and why government should fund cultural activities
(Netzer, 1978). The so-called culture wars of the 1970s and 1980s questioned the very
worthiness of cultural funding. Critics deemed some publicly funded artists and exhibitions to be
obscene and unworthy of taxpayer money, fueling a debate on what role, if any, government
should play in funding the arts (Bolton, 1992).
More recently, cultural policy analysis has shifted its focus towards better understanding
the broader financial and civic relevance of the cultural life of city. Sharon Zukin, in The Culture
of Cities, examines how cities use culture to market and develop themselves (1995). Richard
Florida’s influential work bolstered the concept of the “creative class,” workers in the artistic and
creative world whom cities quickly sought to lure into newly established “creative districts”
(2002; 2008). Florida’s work inspired cities across the world to build a new generation of
cultural facilities, as urban centers sought to revitalize their economies and entice new residents
and tourists alike (Wetherell 2017).
These lines of investigation certainly inform our understanding how cultural institutions
interact with various levels of governments in the United States. They bring to mind Woodrow
Wilson’s root question for public administration, “what the state should do and how it could do it
most efficiently” (Sager and Rosser 2009, 1137). As important as such works are, however, they
leave aside the fundamental question of why local funding for the arts varies so much across
America, not only in amounts but which level of government provides the most funding and why
that varies across municipalities. By better understanding what causes cities to fund culture at
different levels, we may learn how the local state comes to invest in this immeasurably impactful
aspect of city life and how this involvement, or lack of involvement, influences the artistic
institutions that define the cultural life of American cities.
5

The first study attempting to measure city funding for the arts was a Library of Congress
survey of 38 cities, conducted in conjunction with efforts to establish an arts and culture fund for
the District of Columbia (figure 1) in 1959. The difficulty of compiling consistent data across
municipalities was evident even then, as its report to Congress included the qualifier that “since a
definition of the phrase ‘cultural activities’ was not included…some of the information received
and also listed on the enclosed chart may be extraneous to your purposes, depending on how one
defines ‘cultural activities’ ” (Congressional Record 1959, 19783-19784).

Figure 1: Portion of the First Identifiable Survey of Municipal Arts Support. As performed by
Congressional researchers for the creation of a municipal District of Columbia arts fund.
Source: United States Congress, Congressional Record (1959).
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Mark Schuster (1988) further explored variance in arts funding in “An Inquiry into the
Geographic Correlates of Government Arts Funding,” although this research measured only
federal and state expenditures. In prior research, Schuster compared arts policies across eight
countries and evidenced heightened levels of local government support for the arts in several
countries, including the United States (1985). The edited volume Public Money & the Muse
(Benedict 1991) frequently acknowledged the underexplored nature of local government
funding, while Paul DiMaggio emphasized the need for future researchers to compile reliable
information on such expenditures (DiMaggio 1991).
Many of the essays in The Arts of Democracy (2007), edited by Blake, explore the
concept of public art in American and the role of the state in sponsoring and promoting artistic
enterprises (2007). Kammen’s essay in “Culture and the State in America,” promotes the ideal of
a more broad “cultural federalism” in America, linking efforts between local, state, and federal
levels in a way yet unseen in this country. “The U.S. government has never had a national
cultural policy – unless the decision not to have one can, in some perverse way, be considered a
policy of sorts” (2007, 74).
Following the Great Recession of 2008, Rosenstein, Riley, Rocha, and Boenecke
explored how some state governments provided general operating support via State Arts
Agencies (SAAs) as well as through direct budget line-items and cultural trusts. They found that
while SAA support appears somewhat equitable, line-items and other sources of funding could
be heavily weighted towards a few recipients, particularly to those described as “hybrid publicnonprofit institutions that serve as a basic infrastructure for the sector” (2013, 188). Such studies
that seek to calculate total public arts expenditures, looking beyond merely a single government
arts agency within each locality, help us work toward a more comprehensive understanding of
7

arts funding. Funding can flow from many different sources. If previous research has failed to
look more closely at funding at the local level it can be understood to be due to this very issue:
comparing across municipalities can be challenging as their funding mechanisms differ as much
as their funding outputs.

Measuring the Disparity
To understand why funding levels vary across local governments, it is necessary to
accurately measure local spending levels. As previously acknowledged by researchers, this type
of data can be limited and hidden. To overcome such difficulties, Americans for the Arts began
an annual census of local arts agencies in 2015. 3 The Local Arts Agency Census, a
“comprehensive annual survey to track the budgets and programs of America’s 4,500 LAAs,”
provides the most robust dataset currently available on annual arts spending at the local level
(Americans for the Arts “Profile of Local Arts Agencies”). However, challenges remain when
using it to compare localities.
A local arts agency, if funded directly via a city budget, may merely be one way a local
government spends on arts and culture. City budgets contain many other significant amounts that
flow indirectly to such functions. (For example, much arts education funding in New York City
flows through the public school system, not the cultural organizations.) 4 Expenditures
specifically for organizations in public-private partnerships may have their own separate line-

3

Americans for the Arts, founded in 1996, is a national arts advocacy organization. However, its origins
began the 1960s, and it has a history of working across all levels of government to advocate for increased
arts funding and enhanced cultural policy.
4
New York City spends a sizable amount of money on arts education through the department of
education, of which much is spent engaging with public-private cultural institutions (Lorek 2016). This
type of spending is not included in this research, but it is worth noting. It is likely that such kinds of
funding also vary across localities.
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items within the city budget. Similarly, the types of organizations that local arts agencies fund
differ depending on how the municipality classifies arts and cultural activities. The New York
City Department of Cultural Affairs not only funds museums and performing arts centers, but
also botanic gardens, aquariums, and zoos. Dallas, on the other hand, funds zoos, aquariums, and
botanic gardens through its parks and recreation department. This is the same challenge faced by
congressional researchers in 1959.
A more uniform definition of arts and culture is necessary to begin to understand the true
variation in local funding levels. This research addresses this question by defining the range of
funding recipients broadly, as exemplified by the range of activities supported by New York
City’s Department of Cultural Affairs. This list includes non-profit arts organizations of various
types, as well as zoos, aquariums, and botanic gardens, in addition to individual artist
commissions.
Table 1 classifies those types as organizations and funding recipients to be considered
arts and culture funding recipients for the purposes of this research. Applying a uniform
categorization across all cities allows us to capture the variation in the same phenomena across
city budgets.

Table 1. Categorization of Arts and Culture Funding Recipients for the Purposes of This
Research
Funding Recipient
Museums (all types)

Included in Arts and Culture
categorization for this
research
Yes

Performing Arts Centers

Yes

Artist Commissions

Yes
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Theaters and concert halls

Yes

Botanic Gardens

Yes

Nonprofit film centers

Yes

Zoo and aquariums

Yes

Libraries

No

Capital constructions costs (when identifiable)

No

Exclusively educational schools and/or colleges

No

Indirect arts funding through the education system

No

Convention Centers and Arenas

No

Since the previously mentioned American for the Arts’ LAA Census provides an
inconsistent, self-reported methodology of arts and culture spending, this more uniform
definition provides a better basis for measuring arts and culture funding across localities.
The most recently available 2018 LAA Census examines fiscal year 2017 expenditures,
so this independent data gathering uses the same study year, so that the findings could be
compared to the LAA Census. Data gathering examined the detailed operating budgets for 24
cities for fiscal year 2017 and aggregated all relevant spending components. Table 2 provides
summary details regarding aggregate arts and culture spending across the 24 cities. These cities
include 24 of the 25 largest cities in America (United States Census Bureau 2018). Washington
D.C. was excluded as its unique location as the federal capital results in an elevated amount of
federal arts spending. In addition, the federal government owns many of the city’s cultural
facilities. Such an environment would clearly skew local spending data.
Table 2 provides the budgeted operating expenditures across all arts and culture
categories (as defined in table 1). All pertinent city budget items were summed to provide a total
10

arts and culture expenditure for comparison (See appendix A for data sources). 2017 estimated
populations are used to calculate a per capita spend on arts and culture (a per resident
calculation of total arts and culture expenditure divided by 2017 estimated total population). In
addition, the overall city operating budgets are used to calculate the share of the total budget
used for arts and culture. Those amounts range of 0.09% (Indianapolis) to 1.56% (Dallas) of
total city operating budgets.

Table 2. Total Arts and Culture Spending in Fiscal Year 2017 in 24 American cities.
City, State

Austin, TX

FY2017 City
Operating Total Arts
and Culture
Expenditure
$22,758,629

FY2017 City
Operating Per
Capita Spend on
Arts and Culture
$23.91

Share of Total
Budget Used for
Arts and Culture
0.47%

Boston, MA

$2,687,516

$3.90

0.11%

Charlotte, NC

$8,836,020

$10.28

0.68%

Chicago, IL

$66,500,151

$24.51

0.80%

Columbus, OH

$8,147,615

$9.24

0.46%

Dallas, TX

$39,486,120

$29.40

1.56%

Denver, CO

$17,148,804

$24.31

0.90%

Detroit, MI
El Paso, TX

$2,970,000
$11,545,655

$4.41
$16.91

0.16%
1.33%

Fort Worth, TX

$14,452,888

$16.51

0.82%

Houston, TX

$26,081,870

$11.25

0.51%

Indianapolis, IN

$1,000,000

$1.16

0.09%

Jacksonville, FL

$10,305,566

$11.56

0.47%

Los Angeles, CA

$17,623,401

$4.43

0.20%

Nashville-Davidson, TN

$5,375,000

$8.08

0.26%

$181,774,411

$21.54

0.22%

Philadelphia, PA

$8,696,688

$5.50

0.21%

Phoenix, AZ

$7,105,983

$4.35

0.26%

Portland, OR

$8,113,328

$12.51

0.21%

San Antonio, TX

$11,100,779

$7.34

0.56%

New York, NY
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San Diego, CA

$27,721,054

$19.60

0.94%

San Francisco, CA

$53,945,042

$61.36

0.60%

San Jose, CA
Seattle, WA
Mean

$16,323,981
$28,551,258
$24,927,157

$15.82
$39.13
$16.13

0.69%
0.53%
0.55%

Median

$12,999,272

$12.03

0.52%

Figure 2 illustrates the extreme variation in total arts and culture expenditure across
American cities in FY 2017. Totals range from one million dollars in fiscal year 2017 arts
funding by the City of Indianapolis to over 181 million dollars by the City of New York.

Indianapolis

$1,000,000

Boston

$2,687,516

Detroit

$2,970,000

Nashville-…

$5,375,000

Phoenix

$7,105,983

Portland

$8,113,328

Columbus

$8,147,615

Philadelphia

$8,696,688

Charlotte

$8,836,020

Jacksonville

$10,305,566

San Antonio

$11,100,779

El Paso

$11,545,655

Fort Worth

$14,452,888

San Jose

$16,323,981

Denver

$17,148,804

Los Angeles

$17,623,401

Austin
Houston

$22,758,629
$26,081,870

San Diego

$27,721,054

Seattle

$28,551,258

Dallas
San Francisco
Chicago

$39,486,120
$53,945,042
$66,500,151

New York City

$181,774,411

Figure 2. Total City Arts and Culture Expenditures in FY 2017 Operating Budgets.
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Figure 3 shows the same distribution, controlling for population (total arts and culture
expenditure divided by 2017 estimated population). Although the variation is less extreme and
the overall ranking of cities changes, the disparity continues. These two charts show just how
different American cities are in their financial commitments to arts and cultural activities,
broadly construed.

Indianapolis
Boston
Detroit

$1.16
$3.90
$4.41

Nashville-…
Phoenix

$8.08
$4.35

Portland

$12.51

Columbus
Philadelphia

$9.24
$5.50

Charlotte

$10.28

Jacksonville
San Antonio

$11.56
$7.34

El Paso

$16.91

Fort Worth

$16.51

San Jose

$15.82

Denver
Los Angeles

$24.31
$4.43

Austin
Houston
San Diego

$23.91
$11.25
$19.60

Seattle

$39.13

Dallas

$29.40

San Francisco
Chicago
New York City

$61.36
$24.51
$21.54

Figure 3. Total Per Capita Arts and Culture Expenditures in FY 2017 Operating Budgets
(Ordered by total Budget Amount).

As expected, New York City and Boston mark two extremes of local spending on arts
and culture. However, though New York City far exceeds all other cities in total spending, it
13

only ranks seventh on a per capita basis. San Francisco has the highest level of local government
support per capita, while Indianapolis and Detroit join Boston as the lowest funders. San
Francisco’s city budget provides a significant amount of funding both to specific museums,
particularly public-private partnerships in city-owned buildings, as well as to the San Francisco
Arts Commission. Los Angeles, which ranks ninth in overall spending (spending more than 17
million in 2017), provides only $4.43 in per capita arts spending, suggesting the importance of
controlling for population when analyzing local government arts funding. When controlling for
population the amount of some city’s expenditures can be lessened or made more significant.
The median value of $12.03 in per capita funding provides a standard against which to
grade cities as having high or low funding levels. (While table 2 also provides a measure of arts
funding as a proportion of the overall city budget, the many other factors that may shape the
contents of any city budget make that a far less informative measure than per capita arts funding
for the purpose of this research.)
Explaining the Variation
What explains this variation in arts and culture funding? Funding levels do not appear to
be correlated to region or city size, especially on a per capita basis. While most American cities
lean Democratic, some cities with Republican mayors, such as Forth Worth and San Diego, are
on the higher end of funding levels.5 This suggests that arts and culture funding may be
attributed to reasons beyond party affiliation, population, or geographic location.
Nor can we attribute arts and culture funding to the relative importance of the arts and
cultural sectors to a given city. SMU DataArts, a nationally recognized research foundation

5

Both cities have non-partisan mayoral elections, although the mayors are aligned with the Republican
Party.
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focused on the arts and culture sector, produces an annual “Arts Vibrancy Index” meant to
measure levels of arts and culture in cities across the United States. Many of the cities with the
lowest levels of local government funding—Boston, Nashville-Davidson, and Philadelphia—
regularly appear as among the most vibrant arts cities in America, as measured by the population
of artists, number of organizations and employees, revenue, among other metrics (Z. Voss and G.
Voss, et al. 2017; 2018; 2019). Levels of local government support does not appear to be
sufficiently caused by increased levels of arts and culture within a city, although prior research
has suggested that an increased number of arts organizations is a necessary condition for
government support (Schuster 1988).
Returning to the idea first drawn from looking at Boston and New York City, we can
explore whether the city ownership of cultural facilities, or the lack thereof, helps explain
variation in arts and culture funding. We can begin by looking at the extent to which city
governments in these 24 cities own the buildings and land that house their museums and other
cultural organizations. This involved a second data gathering effort, alongside the examination of
the detailed budgets, to determine the ownership of arts and cultural organizations and facilities,
as defined in table 1. Research has found that no such data has been previously collected.
This dataset was constructed by examining the largest cultural organizations in each city,
as defined by their annual operating budgets and expenditures. (Organizational operating budgets
were drawn from the Cultural Data Profile developed by SMU DataArts—an annual survey of
financial, programmatic, and demographic information on cultural nonprofits.) This list was then
cross-referenced against GuideStar, a database of United States based non-profit organizations,
to ensure that data was gathered from any large organization and/or facility that may not have
participated in SMU DataArts’ Cultural Data Profile survey.
15

As some cultural organizations may share operations within the same physical venue,
particularly in the performing arts, this dataset treats each venue as the unit of observations, not
the individual organizations. In many cases a cultural center unifies multiple venues, such as
Lincoln Center in New York City or the Blumenthal Performing Arts Center in Charlotte, North
Carolina. Data was gathered for six to nine cultural facilities for each of the 24 cities. These
cultural facilities can be thought of as the anchor arts facilities for their locality’s cultural
industry.6
To determine whether the local government owned an anchor arts facility, a recent
audited financial statement was reviewed. An audited financial statement typically describes the
organization’s relationship to its facilities and buildings. If the buildings are city-owned, such an
arrangement is typically detailed. The Dallas Museum of Art, for example, details this
relationship in its audited financial statement as, “under an agreement with the City of Dallas, all
on-site land and buildings of the Museum are the property of the City” (Dallas Museum of Art
2019). If the organization itself owns the facility, it reports those building(s) as assets, valued in
the millions. Less commonly, some organizations may rent their facilities from a private
landlord and the audited financial statement lists the rent as an expenditure.
For organizations that did not make their audited financial statements public, the study
reviewed IRS form 990s to determine whether the organization listed the building as an asset. As
990s do not provide as much context as audited financial statements, if no building assets were
reported, indicating possible third-party ownership, then the investigation turned to news

6

Anchor institutions were first introduced as a concept that included non-profits, universities, and
hospitals. Karen Brooks Hopkins uses the concept “anchor arts institutions” more particularly to describe
“anchor cultural institutions” which are “enduring [arts] organizations that remain in their geographic
locations and play a vital role in their local communities and economies” (Brooks Hopkins 2019). For the
purposes of this research the term anchor arts facility draws from Brooks Hopkins.
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accounts, building records, annual reports, or other historical records to determine the ownership
of the facilities. The resulting information is detailed in appendix A, which shows the ownership
of the largest anchor arts facilities in each of the 24 cities.
Facilities are listed as either 100% city-owned, 0% city-owned, or a proportion in
between, particularly where privately-owned facilities were on city land. 7 Figure 4 orders the
annual per capita arts funding for fiscal year 2017 according to the level of local government
ownership of their anchor arts cultural facilities. Figure 5, using the same data, provides a
scatterplot of city ownership and per capita funding, as well as a linear regression model,
illustrating the strong positive correlation between a city owning its anchor arts facilities and
increased levels of annual local government support for arts and culture.

7

Ground lease arrangements with local government were found in several cities including Chicago,
Phoenix, and Fort Worth.
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Figure 4. Per Capita Expenditures in FY 2017, Ordered by Ownership Levels of Anchor Arts
Facilities (0% to 88%).
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Figure 5. Scatterplot of Per Capita Arts Funding and Ownership of Anchor Arts Facilities.
OLS Fit (Bold Line) and 95% Confidence Bands (Dashed Lines).
Note: **Ownership of Facilities Coefficient of 0.3259, statistically significant at 95% confidence
level. p < .01

As the scatterplot suggests, there is a strong and rising correlationship between ownership
of a city’s largest cultural facilities and public funding for arts and culture. Future research may
seek to include a more exhaustive survey of cultural organizations and facilities, but this initial
inquiry of only six to nine of the largest anchor arts facilities, illustrates how strongly the two
variables are correlated. The intercept of -2.0571, although a theoretical impossibility, suggests
minimal amount of annual arts funding can be expected with 0% city-ownership of anchor arts
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cultural facilities. The model predicts an approximate funding level of 30 dollars per capita
annually if ownership of anchor arts facilities is at 100%.
The OLS model is less accurately predictive of funding levels the higher the level of
ownership. The spread of outliers increases as ownership increases, with Charlotte and Phoenix
particularly underperforming as arts funders, despite a relatively high level of ownership. San
Francisco has a per capita funding level more than double many of its peers, and well outside the
model’s estimate.8
This may have to do with the limited survey of facilities in each city, although it may also
indicate a necessary but insufficient condition for increased annual funding. While none of the
cities with less than 50% of ownership of its anchor arts facilities provided more than $12 per
capita in annual arts funding in 2017 (and were all well inside the model’s prediction), all cities
with higher levels of per capita arts spending had elevated levels of ownership. Several cities,
including Jacksonville, Phoenix, Houston, and Charlotte, have high levels of ownership without
increased funding levels. Future research on why this discrepancy exists in these cities would
provide further insights into the mechanisms at play in municipal arts funding. Those four cities
can all be described as late-developing, corporate service cities, while their ownership of cultural
facilities is heavily weighted by newer, corporate sponsored facilities. Such a condition will be
explored later in this research.

8

San Francisco’s elevated level of annual funding is heavily weighted by funding to two institutions: The
Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco (which includes the de Young Museum and the Legion of Honor)
and the San Francisco Asian Art Museum. Those three museums received half of the total 54 million
dollars in city arts funding in fiscal year 2017. All three museums are in city-owned buildings and their
relationship with the city is written into the city charter further emphasizing the correlation of facility
ownership to funding.
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Figure 6 illustrates the necessary but insufficient condition evident for increased levels of
annual operating support. It categorizes cities as having high or low levels of funding, with the
median value of $12.03 as the threshold, and high or low levels or core facility ownership, above
or below 50%.
Level of Annual Funding

Level of Ownership of Arts Facilities
Low
High

High
Austin
Chicago
Dallas
Denver
El Paso
Fort Worth
New York City
Portland
San Francisco
San Diego
San Jose
Seattle

none

Low

Charlotte
Columbus
Houston
Jacksonville
Phoenix

Boston
Detroit
Indianapolis
San Antonio
Philadelphia
Los Angeles
Nashville-Davidson

Figure 6: Correlation Outcomes Between Levels of Anchor Arts Facility
Ownership and Annual Funding
Figure 6 illustrates that the twelve cities with the highest annual per capita funding levels
all have elevated levels of ownership among their anchor arts facilities. Of the 12 cities with the
lowest funding, five have high ownership without additional funding, and seven cities have both
low levels of funding and ownership. There are no cities with high funding levels and low
ownership.
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Additionally, research has found that a high proportion of the total arts budget in most
cities is designated to public-private partnership organizations that live in city buildings.
Chicago, Dallas, Fort Worth, Seattle, San Francisco, and New York City all designated more
than 50% of their arts budget to those organizations that live in city buildings. Even cities with
low funding levels allocated a high proportion of their funding to the few public-private
partnerships that are present in their city, including Phoenix, Philadelphia, Nashville-Davidson,
and Detroit. Detroit had its entire three million dollar arts budget allocated to three city-owned
facilities: the Charles H. Wright Museum of African American History, the Detroit Historical
Museum, and the Detroit Zoo.9

Origins of City Ownership – New York City vs Boston
If ownership of cultural facilities helps explain a city’s funding levels for arts and culture,
what explains why a city decides to take ownership in the first place? What is the origin of a
city’s willingness to take ownership or build a cultural facility such as a museum or performing
arts center? While it is not feasible at this stage to explore the origin stories in all 24 cities,
further exploration of the New York and Boston cases offers some important leads.
Boston and New York City exemplify two different approaches to the beginnings of the
modern American museum. In New York City the public-private partnership began with the
founding of the American Museum of Natural History and the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
Boston’s arts landscape was originally framed by the private founding of The Museum of Fine

9

Zoos in particular, as considered art and culture organizations, can take a sizable portion of a city’s
allocation. El Paso, Fort Worth, and San Diego all spent more than half of their expenditures on the city
zoo. Zoos are also the most likely type of organization to be city-owned, even among cities with low
ownership shares of their anchor arts facilities.
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Arts, Boston. The Met Museum and the MFA were both founded in 1870s, in what were then the
largest and seventh largest cities in America. New York City, at the time consisting of only
Manhattan and the Bronx, had a population of 942,292, while Boston’s population was 250,526
(United States Census Bureau 1870). Emerging from the Civil War, both cities were prosperous
and wealthy benefactors were interested in creating impressive museums to rival those in Europe
(Horowitz 1989, 1-26).
The Union League Club, having taken upon itself the task of constructing a plan for the
creation of a fine arts museum in New York, recorded at their October 14, 1869 meeting, “It will
be said that it would be folly to depend upon our governments, either municipal or national, for
judicious support or control in such an institution; for our governments, as a rule, are utterly
incompetent for the task” (Howe and Watson 1913, 102). Though this was an inauspicious
opening for a partnership with the City of New York, a group of city elites, officials, artists, and
notable men gathered with the Union League Club a month later to make official the plan for the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, choosing a setting of Central Park, and striking a partnership with
New York City’s Park Commissioners to participate in the funding and creation of the Museum.
The New York Evening Mail wrote, “the cooperation of the Park Commissioners means,
in the first place, a site worth half a million dollars, whereon to erect a museum; secondly, it
means invaluable assistance in raising the necessary funds to erect the building; and thirdly, it
means invaluable advice in its construction and the best custodianship of it and its treasures
when it is a completed thing” (Howe and Watson 1913, 118).
“The actual housing of the Museum there [in Central Park], in a building erected and
owned by the city, and the lease which defines the relationship between the museum and the city
in its occupation of the building, bear testimony to the wisdom of its founders and the far-sighted
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policy of those public officials who at the time of its organization represented our city” (Howe
and Watson 1913, viii-ix).
It is worth noting that this occurred in the same year as a similar public-private
partnership creating the American Museum of Natural History on the west side of Central Park.
It is often written that the AMNH was the founding institution for public-private cultural
partnership in America, and while technically true, much of the planning and progress happened
concurrently with the founding of the Met Museum.
The following year, both the Met Museum and AMNH projects would require New York
State to pass special legislation authorizing the City and Department of Parks to issue public
bonds to enable them to begin construction. “For several weeks previous to this date a committee
of the Museum working jointly with a committee from the American Museum of Natural History
had exorcised all vigilance and discretion in pushing this bill through the Legislature” (Howe and
Watson 1913, 138).
“In Boston there was no free land in a public park to settle on as it profited the
Metropolitan Museum to do in New York’s Central Park” (Rathbone 1984, 43). In partnership
with the Boston Athenæum, a private membership library, benefactors secured funds exclusively
from private donors without funding from local government. Perry T. Rathbone, President of the
Museum of Fine Art from 1955 to 1972, writes enviously of the city funding and foundational
support received by their regional neighbors:
The experience of the Metropolitan Museum, though almost as private an
institution as the Museum of Fine Arts, was of wide variance in influencing the
public policy of New York City. The gifts received and the popularity of the
Metropolitan in its first years had their effect on the city [of Boston] fathers, so
much so that as early as 1896, the Boston trustees, bitterly suffering their deficits,
could look with envy upon their rival which had received $90,000 from the New
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York City treasury for current expenses. Such municipal ‘care and feeding’
ordained by public policy has continued in lesser or greater degree ever since.
(Rathbone 1984, 46)
Speaking at a symposium in New York City in 1983, Rathbone would describe what he
perceived as the reasons for the lack of involvement of the City of Boston in the creation of the
Museum of Fine Arts. He placed the decision on the shoulders of the Museum founders, and the
culture of the Boston public, not on any overt policy decision by the city government, “I think
what Bostonians feared from the beginning was the possible involvement of the city government.
That’s what they hoped to avoid at all costs, and with good reason…It’s not public land and it
never was.” (Lowry 1984, 153). He described an origin story where it was not the City of Boston
who was unwilling to partner in the creation of a city-owned museum, but that the museum
founders thought such a partnership untenable. This is not unlike the previously shared opinion
of The Union League Club, just a month prior to the Met Museum’s founding in New York City.
Yet, despite the Museum of Fine Arts founders’ aversion to a public-private partnership, they
nonetheless would seem to have later regretted that decision, “looking on with envy” in harder
times. The differences in these two beginnings, in Boston and New York City, suggest the
precariousness of decision-making that potential public-private partnerships rest upon, and the
long legacy the follows them.
DiMaggio also explores the origins of the MFA and its founders, the culturally elite
Boston Brahmins, who were perhaps reticent to partner with a city government increasingly
made up of members of the populist Know-Nothings party. As Boston’s political establishment
became more hostile to the elite class, the Brahmins sought to maintain “some control over the
community” through the creation of a system of non-profit institutions, of which the MFA was a
primary component (DiMaggio 1986, 48).
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The MFA would continue to proclaim proudly its independence from government
support well into the twentieth-century. Within its annual handbook, as early as 1910, the MFA
would state that “no support from State or City was provided for, and none has ever been
received. In Granting the Museum the site of the first building in Copley Square, the City acted
as an agent for the Boston Water Power Company, from who it had received the property for a
museum or park” (MFA Boston 1964, 379). Within its main rotunda, an inscription would also
proclaim it as a museum “built and maintained entirely with the gifts of private citizens”
although it would later be removed in 1966, when the MFA received a $100,000 grant from the
State of Massachusetts to underwrite school visits (Clotfelter 1991, 238).
Public-private partnerships, during the era of Reconstruction through the Progressive era
of 1865 to 1916, benefited from the ideals of cultural elites and city officials who sought to grow
American cities into cultured and respected global cities. Later, the New Deal saw a short-lived
increase in federal funding for new cultural facilities. This “radical departure” from previous
involvement in the arts by the federal government nonetheless made a lasting contribution to the
cultural landscape in America (Cummings Jr 1991, 40-41).
The latter half of the twentieth-century saw new cultural facilities being built as tools of
economic development in cities. Many were built with a new aim of renewing and reviving
urban centers after periods of economic and social decline. Cities like New York, Chicago, and
Seattle put efforts into including new cultural centers, and increasingly included the performing
arts into their plans for urban revitalization (Foulkes 2010; Gilfoyle 2006; Strom 2003).
Regardless of the era, the public-private partnerships that occurred after those initial institutional
arrangements in New York City, all owe a debt of gratitude to an innovative form of governance
that allows for autonomy as well as continued financial support.
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Causation or Merely Correlation?
Returning to the correlation between ownership and funding, the question then becomes
whether this is simply a measurement of the same effect. Is the ownership of cultural facilities
and corresponding annual funding expenditure merely the same output of a city government’s
willingness to support arts and culture? There is reason to suspect that they are not the same
thing, and that ownership is a causal variable that affects the level of support within a city’s
annual operating budget.
The following sections will draw on theories from historical institutionalism, new
institutionalism, and path dependency. This work emphasizes the effects that decisions can have
on the creation of institutions, and how those processes may bind future decision making and
often result in unintended consequences.
Suggesting that these theories will help explain why facility ownership is a causal
mechanism, one that leads to increased support for arts and culture, will proceed by emphasizing
four concepts:


Ownership of cultural facilities can be thought of as the first step in a process of
institutionalization of arts and culture within city government.



Decisions made regarding taking or accepting ownership of cultural facilities,
particularly at their origin, are often made without intentions of providing elevated
levels of operating support.



Increased levels of annual operating support may be delayed following initial
periods of ownership. The effect is a process that occurs over time.



Once in effect, increased levels of ownership and funding can be difficult to deescalate. Budgetary decision-makers are confined by historic decisions and
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processes. Uncoupling city government from ownership is rare and requires
exogenous forces.

The Institutionalization of Arts and Culture Within City Government
To suggest that a city’s ownership of cultural facilities institutionalizes a specific form of
arts and cultural policy, we must clarify what we mean by the term institution. Drawing heavily
from the work of March and Olsen, Peters defines this frequently nebulous term by distilling its
most durable characteristics. Institutions are persisting formal structures, with interrelated rules
and routines that can bind behaviors, even if such behaviors can go against a member’s selfinterest (Peters 2019).
Tolbert and Zucker describe the act of institutionalization as a process that unfolds over
time. Rather than a binary state, institutionalization processes can be sequential and contain
patterns and variations that require qualitative analysis (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). Their work,
defining the process of institutionalization, describes three stages—habitualization,
objectification, and sedimentation—and suggests variability with each stage (1999).
Habitualization involves “the generation of new structural arrangements in response to a
specific organizational problem or set of problems” (Tolbert and Zucker 1996, 181). This stage
could describe the origination of public-private partnerships in New York City and the founding
of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the American Museum of Natural History. Institutional
entrepreneurs used these public-private partnerships to overcome obstacles in creating
foundational museums in nineteenth-century New York City. Land and resources were needed,
and this relationship allowed for the construction to take place in city parkland, with some
funding provided by the municipal government. As Zucker and Tolbert suggest, “imitation may
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follow [habitualization], but there is little sense of the necessity of this among organizational
decision-makers, since there is no consensus on the general utility of the innovation” (1996,
181). Boston fits such a scenario, among other cities, because no public-private partnership was
sought to launch the Museum of Fine Arts, rather it was avoided. All museums founded in
American in the years following the New York museums were aware of the public-private
innovation. The long-term outcomes, however, from that organizational arrangement were yet to
be known.
Objectification follows habitualization. For the structure created during the prior stage to
expand and spread, decision-makers must share an understanding of its value and meaning. In
New York City’s context, that could include city officials, bureaucrats, as well as arts and culture
administrators.10 Outcomes that emerged from city-ownership of museums, such as an emphasis
on public access and education, as well as financial stability and expansion, led elites to a shared
understanding of what it means for a museum to live in a city-owned building. By the turn of the
twentieth-century, Boston’s museum officials envied the increasing amount of local government
support received by New York institutions and acknowledged that funding’s link to early
decisions on facility ownership (Rathbone 1984).
Finally, a stage of sedimentation concludes the process of institutionalization.
Sedimentation replicates the new structure, in this case the city-ownership of cultural facilities,
across the country. In addition, “the perpetuation of structures over a lengthy time” further

10

Within a nineteenth-century context, arts and culture professionals may be thought of as exclusively
museum leaders and board members. A more broadly defined organizational field of arts and culture,
including the performing arts, among other art forms, would only become widely accepted into the
twentieth-century, perhaps as the result of its own process of institutionalization.
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cements the breadth and endurance of what was once innovative and new (Tolbert and Zucker
1996).
Once fully institutionalized, it is increasingly difficult to reverse these structures. Within
New York City, more cultural organizations and facilities would be incorporated into the
arrangement. The Bronx Zoo and The New York Botanical Garden would join in being built as
public-private partnerships with New York City’s municipal government. In Brooklyn, while
still an independent city, additional homes for cultural organizations would be constructed in
buildings owned by local government. These New York City institutions would later come to
form the Cultural Institutions Group (CIG), a quasi-formal organization of arts and cultural nonprofits that all reside in city-owned buildings (NYC Department of Cultural Affairs “History of
Cultural Institutions Group”).
Elsewhere in America, Chicago and Seattle elites would build their own cultural facilities
in partnership with local government.11 By the first half of the twentieth-century, the
sedimentation of public-private partnerships between arts non-profits and city government had
been fully realized. This sedimentation is evident both externally, as the model of the publicprivate partnership proliferated across the country, but also within cities, as places like New
York, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco replicated the model as their cultural facility portfolios
expanded.
This three-stage process helps conceptualize the institutionalization of arts and culture
within city government. Ownership of cultural facilities is the first stage in the process of
creating formalized rules and mechanisms to structure the relationship between the arts and

11

Chicago saw many of its cultural building built in Grant Park, via ground leases with the City of
Chicago. Although the non-profits retained ownership of the buildings, these ground lease arrangements
formed a similar public-private partnership to that of city-ownership.
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culture sector and city government. With ownership, more funding is likely, as evidenced by the
previous analysis of 24 cities. The current funding levels and ownership-stakes are bound by preexisting relationships that endure and become sediment within the city bureaucracy. Instances of
change within this system, to be illustrated later, are rare and require significant exogenous
forces.
Cities that lack this structure, who have not institutionalized arts and culture, all have low
levels of funding for their local non-profits. Furthermore, the lack of a formalized relationship
leaves what little funding there is vulnerable to austerity.
This suggestion that the institutionalization of arts and cultural policy in American cities
comes from ownership of facilities, emerging from a New York City public-private model, is in
contrast to DiMaggio focus on the institutionalization of “high culture” stemming from
nineteenth-century Boston (DiMaggio 1986). DiMaggio’s theory of institutionalism within the
arts, however, refers specifically to the organizational structure and governance model of cultural
non-profits. His argument does not necessarily conflict with the idea that a broader model of the
institutionalization of American arts in relation to local governments emerged from New York
City.
It can be said, however, that Boston’s model of privately-controlled cultural
organizations, as described by DiMaggio, often deters the outcomes that emerge from a New
York City model, where local government has the additional authority to be an agenda-setting
partner in the arts and culture industry. DiMaggio writes that Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts was
founded with a broad educational mission, one that ebbed over the course of several decades and
ultimately led the MFA to “abandon its broad social mission in favor of aestheticism and an elite
clientele” (DiMaggio 1986, 58). In contrast, those arts and culture organizations institutionalized
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within city government seem inclined to move towards a broader social mission over time. To
the extent that a purely artistic-focused agenda can at times conflict with a broader social
mission, city government can, at the best of times, be an altruistic force bending organizations
towards more equitable and inclusive practices.

Increasing Returns: Path Dependent Models of Ownership and Support
If taking ownership of cultural facilities is the first step in one specific form of
institutionalization of arts and cultural activities, what aspect of this process results in increased
public support for operational expenses? Drawing on the work of Paul Pierson, this section
explores how increased operating support results from facility ownership + time + constrained
decision making + increased political authority, specifically among actors within city
government and the arts and culture organizational field.
Pierson suggests that “analysts are increasingly inclined to invoke path dependence, but
clear definitions are rare” (2004, 20). Intending to move beyond mere platitudes that “history
matters,” Pierson attempts to clarify key processes and concepts for its use within political and
public policy analysis. Pierson employs the term path-dependency to mean, “social processes
that exhibit positive feedback and thus generate branching patterns of historical development”
(2004, 21). Prior institutional design decisions can constrain future behavior and options, leading
to rooting particular outcomes not in the rational choices of present-day actors or even those in
the past, but in a contextual history constrained by previous decisions. “Despite massive social,
economic, and political changes over time, self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective
action processes—especially high start-up costs, coordination effects, and adaptive
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expectations—mean that organizations will have a strong tendency to persist once they are
institutionalized” (Pierson 2004, 34).
Many explanations of path dependence, including Pierson’s, begin with the thought
experiment of an urn containing two balls, one red and one blue (Pierson 2004). If you take one
ball out randomly, and then return it to the urn with another ball of the same color, and then
repeat the process until the urn fills up, the initial random draw may lead to a strongly weighted
distribution of one color vs the other. Choosing a red ball initially will lead to more red balls than
blue ones for the second draw, increasing the likelihood of drawing another red ball, adding
another again, and again. The initial draw heavily weights the likelihood of one outcome over the
other.
Can it be said the New York’s initial decision to take ownership of the city’s foundational
museums—drawing a red ball—led to more ownership stakes in the future, and Boston’s initial
lack of ownership—drawing a blue ball—led to a continued aversion to such public-private
partnerships? Although neither initial decision was truly random, either outcome was possible
and plausible. The debate was heated in New York City as to whether allowing government
involvement in the new museum would give undue influence to powers that Union League Club
elites deemed potentially harmful. During the same period, in Boston, although the city did not
retain ownership, public authority was used to transfer the deed to the original plot of land,
certainly opening up the possibility that a more lasting partnership could have ensued if the
founders wished for it.
As New York City grew, the decision to form a public-private partnership did have a selfreinforcing character as other emerging cultural organizations, including the Bronx Zoo and the
New York Botanical Garden, joined the process. The consolidation of New York City in 1898,
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incorporating Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island, greatly expanded the footprint for
cultural ownership. Existing organizations that lived in Brooklyn-owned facilities were now
under the auspices of a greater New York City government. This necessitated equitable
distribution of facilities across all five boroughs, furthering New York City’s ownership stake in
arts and culture, now expanded to over 30 facilities.
Furthermore, as other cities in America built their own cultural institutions and facilities,
decisions were made to either follow a public-private model like New York City or a laissezfaire policy such as Boston. Cities such as Chicago and San Francisco imitated the former while
Philadelphia and Indianapolis followed a Boston model.

Mechanism of Increased Support
Pierson poses the question, “are path-dependent arguments just descriptive?” (2004, 91).
It is not merely sufficient to say that history mattered, and decision-makers chose a path.
Explaining the mechanisms that reinforce (or undermine) that initial decision is also required;
“without this, path-dependent arguments degenerate into little more than a description of
stability.” In addition, even stable models experience change and variation. “Change continues
but it is bounded change—until something erodes or swamps the mechanism of reproduction that
generate continuity” (2004, 52).
How does the ownership of facilities lead to an increase in annual support? If truly the
result of a path dependent process, such a mechanism would be the result of an institutional
effect rather than a rational choice, actor-centered functionalist outcome (Pierson 2004). This
section will seek to identify the link between those initial decisions of ownership and the
resulting increased levels of operating support for arts and culture.
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Pierson identifies several limitations of a rational-choice argument regarding institutions
and their outcomes. These limitations dampen notions that the founding participants of an
institution could have designed or anticipated the outcomes that follow, particularly as time
elapses. The following limitations of a rational-choice approach, as noted by Pierson, are useful
in identifying outcomes of cultural facility ownership by local government:


Institutional designers may have short time horizons



Effects may be unanticipated



Institutional continuity that persists despite environmental change



Actor discontinuity

By ruling out a functionalist argument that the institutionalization of arts and cultural
organizations within city government, and the increased amount of economic resources that
comes with it, is merely a product of its initial design, we can begin to identify aspects of the
path-dependent institutional development approach that contribute to its resilience and durability.
The cultural elites and government officials that initiated the public-private partnerships
that emerged in cities such as New York and Chicago were not necessarily looking to fund their
operations with public money on a permanent basis. In most cases, despite modest commitments
to maintain the facilities themselves, they intended for the organizations to fund their operations
entirely themselves. Those early actors would perhaps be surprised to see the millions of dollars
in annual operating support that now flow to city-owned, or city-leased, facilities.
Foundational documents for many public-private institutions detail the initial
arrangements with city government and describe reciprocal commitments of building and
maintenance funds in return for commitments to public service and education. Frequently, they
made little or no commitments for continued operational support.
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In 1891 The Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences (BIAS), founded prior to Brooklyn’s
incorporation into New York City, as approved by the New York State Legislature, was
authorized to receive funds from the City of Brooklyn only “for the purpose of constructing,
erecting and maintaining said building or buildings,” by the issuance of public Museum of Art
and Science Bonds. By the end of the nineteenth-century additional funds were allocated from
said fund for furnishings as well as for heating and lighting cost, totaling $10,000, with
additional language stipulating free admission times for public schools (Brooklyn Institute of
Arts and Sciences 1899). This kind of contractual obligation emphasizes the reciprocal benefit
expected from city ownership and city funding.
By 1921, New York City funding of BIAS totaled $150,817.14, with more than $100,000
of that allocated to staff salaries and wages (Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences 1922). In
1966 those commitments were totaling $1,500,000 from the City of New York, in addition to
similar commitments to the Met Museum and AMNH, among the other city-owned cultural
facilities now comprising the Cultural Institutions Group of New York City (New York Times
1966). Over time cultural commitments swelled from covering construction costs to funds
necessary to maintain operations. As recently as 2016 the Brooklyn Museum, broken off from
the Brooklyn Institute, received more the $7,000,000 from the City of New York (Brooklyn
Museum 2016). This increase in funding overtime far exceeds that of inflation.
Similar narratives can be found in the financial histories of the Seattle Art Museum, first
built on public land in Volunteer Park; the California Academy of Sciences, built in Golden Gate
Park; and The Art Institute of Chicago, built in Grant Park. The initial period of ownership in
each city was predicated on the gifting of city parkland, with additional commitments of
construction and limited maintenance support. After a period of years, or even decades,
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operational support would later come in the form of annual funds via the city budget in each
case. Future research can explore how the slow rise in funding occurred, either by
institutionalized arts lobbying from within city government or perhaps by museum officials who
were able to leverage their position as quasi-public stewards into additional funding by way of
promising public-service-centered outcomes. Obtaining time-series data may likely evidence that
these additional operational funds tend to increase over time, at rates far above inflation.
The durability of annual arts funding in cities that own many of their cultural facilities is
notable. One hypothesis, unproven without additional time-series data, is that funding not only
rises over time, but is also more consistent and sustained in cities that have institutionalized their
arts and culture field. In New York City, this is evident during periods of austerity under Mayor
Lindsay, as well as following the hostile actions Mayor Giuliani took toward the Brooklyn
Museum after opposing their display of Chris Ofili’s “The Holy Virgin Mary," a Madonna made
from elephant dung which the mayor deemed obscene. 12 Attempts to reduce funding to the
Department of Cultural Affairs, and the occasional targeted attacks towards specific organization
such as the Brooklyn Museum, failed due to the sustained power of the institutionalized cultural
field in defending their budgeted support.
In 2003, Mayor Bloomberg sought to drastically reduce New York City’s arts funding,
particularly to the city-housed institutions which receive the bulk of the city’s annual funding.
Mayor Bloomberg was aiming to cut funding to the Cultural Institutions Group members by
26%, from 105.6 million dollars to 77.7 million. The CIGs were able to unify their lobbying

12

Although it was in federal court in 2000 that Mayor Giuliani lost his attempt to cut funding and
possibly evict the Brooklyn Museum from their city building, it was through the additional coordination
by the Museum and other CIGs that they were able to avoid severe cuts to their annual budgets in the
years that followed. (Barstow 1999)
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efforts in a manner that a non-institutionalized cultural sector would be unlikely to achieve. By
lobbying city officials, and leveraging their value to the city, they were able to restore most, if
not all, of their funding and in the following year’s budget the CIGs again received
approximately 100 million dollars of the DCLA’s 120 million dollar budget (Pogrebin 2003;
Mandell 2005).
In contrast, Indianapolis was not only the lowest funder of the 24 cities surveyed, but its
recent history has seen significant cuts to its already modest arts budget. The budget for arts and
culture has been reduced by at least 50% after a new mayor was elected and pushed for austerity
measures. Not only were such cuts implemented, the reduction of funds for culture, first
implemented in 2008, have persisted to this day (Schnitzler 2008). Cultural institutions in New
York and Chicago, however, have been able to mobilize their cultural industry backers to push
back against proposed cuts, or at the very least return them to original levels after a short period
of decline.

Institutional Change
The path is not always upward, however. Detroit and Seattle provide examples of cityownership de-escalating, albeit under two very different circumstances. The Detroit Institute of
Arts had a long history of city ownership. Following the bankruptcy of the city, however, the socalled Grand Bargain provided for the transition of ownership of both the museum and artwork
into a private foundation. The municipal insolvency of Detroit provides the rare example of an
exogenous shock that causes a city government to uncouple itself from its own museum building.
The fact that Detroit owned both the building and the artwork, itself unusual, was rooted in a
1911 decision to allocate city funds towards the purchase of artwork for the museum (Abt 2001,
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84). This more comprehensive institutionalization of the Institute into the local Detroit
government—a public-public partnership—almost proved disastrous once the city began its
economic decline in the latter half of the twentieth-century.
Seattle presents a more recognizable scenario in which the Seattle Art Museum (SAM)
move in 1991 from its original city-owned Volunteer Park location, where it had been housed
since 1933 (Fuller 1993). In contrast to Detroit, Seattle’s population and prominence exploded in
the latter half of the twentieth-century, leaving SAM in a facility far too small for its goals of a
grand expansion. As early as the 1970s, it began to plan for a possible move into a downtown
location. Initially, this was expected to be facilitated by a move into another city-owned building,
the Times Square Building, as part of the proposed Westlake Center development. Museum
planners and officials specifically noted that a move into an expanded city-owned facility could
result in as much as a 100% increase in annual support from the City of Seattle, further
emphasizing the realized connection between facility ownership and annual support (Economics
Research Associates & Seattle Art Museum 1978).
Ultimately SAM made its move through an “innovative but untimely partnership with the
now-dissolved Washington Mutual” bank (Ashley 2014). By foregoing any chance for a publicprivate partnership, SAM went down the path of a corporate-private partnership, one that has
resulted in additional financial hardships for the organization. 13 This form of decoupling from
city-ownership, initiated by the cultural organization due to its own ambitions, may be a more
common outcome. Just as the origins of a public-private partnership require a willing private
partner, the dissolution of that partnership seems more often predicated by a non-profit’s

13

The original SAM building remains city-owned and is now home the SAM-operated Seattle Asian Art
Museum
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willingness to pursue the private market over a continued public partnership. Results can be
mixed.

The Outliers: Jacksonville, Phoenix, Charlotte, and Houston
Interestingly, although all the cities with increased levels of annual spending on the arts
also have high levels of facility ownership, several cities with similarly high levels of ownership
failed to increase funding. What do Jacksonville, Phoenix, Charlotte, and Houston tell us about
the possible causal mechanism at work in city arts funding, and do their positions as outliers
provide additional insight and contextual nuance?
Timing and sequencing are two key elements to understanding a path-dependent
argument of institutional development. The temporal ordering of development can shape
outcomes, making attention to history critical to understanding institutions. “In many cases, the
significance of early events or processes in the sequence may be amplified, while that of later
events or processes is dampened. Thus, when a particular event or process occurs in a sequence
will make a big a difference” (Pierson 2004, 64).
Jacksonville ($11.56), Houston ($11.25), and Charlotte ($10.28) all have 2017 annual per
capita funding levels below the median value of $12.01, despite elevated levels of facility
ownership among their most anchor arts facilities. Despite owning many of their art museums,
performance halls, and ground leases for both the zoo and botanical gardens, Phoenix provided
merely $4.35 in annual arts spending in its Fiscal Year 2017.
Most of the city-owned facilities in these cities were built in the latter half of the
twentieth-century and into the early 2000s. Despite taking ownership of a newly built Phoenix
Art Museum in 1959, Phoenix did not open the Symphony Hall until 1972, the Herberger
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Theatre Center in 1989, and the Arizona Science Center in 1997. The oldest major museum in
Phoenix, the Heard Museum (founded in 1929) and the Musical Instrument Museum opened in
2010, are both entirely privately owned.
Houston’s city-ownership of public-private partnered cultural facilities is also heavily
weighted by more recent additions. Of the oldest facilities in Houston, only the Miller Outdoor
Theater and Houston Zoo have a history of city partnership. Other historic organizations such as
The Museum of Fine Arts, Houston and the Houston Museum of Natural Science are privately
owned, as is the Alley Theatre whose building was constructed in 1968. Only more recently has
the City of Houston taken ownership of more cultural facilities, particularly focused on the
performing arts, such as Jesse H. Jones Hall for the Performing Arts (opened 1966), The
Wortham Theater Center (opened 1987), and The Hobby Center for the Performing Arts (opened
2002).
Apart from the Jacksonville Zoo and Gardens, the largest foundational art museum in
Jacksonville is the privately run and owned Cummer Museum of Art and Gardens, with the land,
art, and building being funded by a private estate in 1958. The city only took ownership of large
cultural facilities in the latter half of the twentieth-century, building the Times-Union Center for
the Performing Arts and purchasing the Florida Theater in 1981.
The late-stage public acquisition of these city’s cultural facilities may play a part in their
low levels of annual support. Just as evidenced in Brooklyn, New York City, Seattle, and
Chicago, it may take years or decades for the operating institutions to achieve elevated levels of
operational support. Also, these cities are seemingly more likely to be engaged heavily with
Business Leadership Coalitions (BLCs) in their public-private partnerships, increasing the role of
business in their funding and management (Austin and McCaffrey 2002). With expanded
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corporate governance in their public-private partnerships these cities may dampen expectations
of an enhanced funding arrangement from the local government. Many of the previously
mentioned new performance centers are operated by corporate management companies. This
includes the Times-Union Center for the Performing Arts (ASM Global) and Jesse H. Jones Hall
for the Performing Arts (Houston First Corporation).
Charlotte provides an example of how the initial period of public ownership may hinder
the possibility of immediate operating support. Beginning in the 1970s, the City of Charlotte
adopted an ambitious cultural facility plan to expand the city’s offering through public-private
partnership, funded by public bonds paid off through revenues and private sector gifts. This plan
yielded several multi-venue facilities that comprise the city-owned Levine Center for the Arts
and the Blumenthal Performing Arts Center, among others (Arts & Science Council 2004). Still,
despite the city owning five of the six major cultural facilities surveyed for this research, annual
per capita funding for the arts is limited at only $10.28 per resident in fiscal year 2017.
However, what such analysis may overlook is the sustained obligations that can coincide
with ambitious capital construction projects, especially when funded by the issuance of
municipal public debt. The City of Charlotte uses the Cultural Facilities Debt Service Fund to
pay the “principal, interest, and related costs for long-term debt associated with the City’s
Cultural Facilities, including the construction of the Levine Center for the Arts Cultural
Facilities” (City of Charlotte 2018, 159; Ryan 2012). Despite the Levine Center being completed
in 2010, the City of Charlotte continues to fund the payment of debts and interest totaling more
than nine million dollars annually. Those non-operating payments by the city exceed their annual
operating expenditures for arts and culture.
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Such non-operating expenditures are obviously necessary in a start-up phase and are an
important component of a city’s overall commitment to arts and culture. Cities like New York or
San Francisco, with a substantial historical legacy of city-owned facilities, no longer have to
amortize the startup costs and can thus shift payments towards maintenance and operations. It
remains possible that Charlotte, once it pays off the debt obligation, may shift to providing
operational funds for their newly debt-free city-owned facilities and their arts organizations.
These four outliers suggest two possible explanations for their low annual funding despite
their high ownership levels. First, institutional development can be a slow-moving process. New
York, San Francisco, or Chicago have all taken lengthy timelines to achieve their current high
levels of arts expenditures. Otherwise, “presuming that policy changes are quickly translated into
expenditure levels (that is, assuming rapidly unfolding outcomes) analysts may mistakenly
construct temporally constricted causal accounts” (Pierson 2004, 91).
Secondly, the temporal sequencing of events may also be important. The fact that these
four cities increased their building of facilities in a later-stage period of city development may
hinder their ability to increase operating funding. It may be true that, just as Kammen observed
that the lack of a national cultural policy may be a policy, municipalities with late-stage
ownership may not be able to overcome an entrenched municipal policy of low arts funding,
particularly if they have become entrenched in a corporatist governance regime.
Figure 7 illustrates a branching path-dependence model in which ownership levels
increase after an initial period, but funding remains low. Such a scenario may be in effect in the
four cities which appear as outliers in the facility-ownership/increased-funding model. Whereas
early stage adopters like New York, San Francisco, and Chicago were able to transition from
their foundational arrangements into increased operational funding in later stages, perhaps a
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city’s acquisition of ownership in a later period precludes an early shift into increased
operational funding. Time may tell.

Founding of
Cultural
Organizations in
Typical American
City
Late 19th/early
20th century

Ownership by Local
Government
through publicprivate partnerships

No Ownership
Stake by Local
Government

Increased levels of
annual arts funding

Low levels of
annual arts funding

Ownership in latter
stage cultural
facilities such as
performing arts
centers
Continued lack of
ownership stake in
cultural facilities

Continued low
levels of annual arts
funding

Figure 7. Hypothetical Path Dependent Model of Initial Ownership vs Latter Stage Ownership

The current COVI-19 crisis has devastated arts and cultural activities and may also alter
future funding patterns. Cities with high ownership levels may be compelled to increase or
sustain existing support for public-private partnerships to prevent them from going out of
business. Such an exogenous event may well have different impacts on cities with or without
institutionalized arts and culture fields. The financial crisis may also compel the city
governments of Jacksonville, Phoenix, Charlotte, and Houston, to increase their funding in the
immediate future. The next few years will provide an opportunity to understand further the
effects of public-private partnership during a time of difficulty for the non-profit sector.
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Implications on Outcomes in the Arts and Culture Sector: New York City’s Cultural
Institutions Group
In addition to the positivist question of why some cities fund arts and culture at higher
levels than others, it is worth asking what cities get in return. Does the increase in funding, as
well as elevated levels of facility ownership, lead to different and better outcomes in the cultural
sector?
This broad question deserves much more research than this study can provide, but we can
consider some of the implications of the evidence already gathered, particularly regarding the
case of New York City. In addition to being the birthplace of the American public-private arts
partnership, New York City has the largest city-owned portfolio of facilities. Most of them
belong to the Cultural Institutions Group, a quasi-formal group of city-owned cultural
organizations with “represent a broad spectrum of cultural endeavor, from art and natural history
museums to historical societies, theaters, concert halls, performing arts centers, botanical gardens
and zoos” (New York City “Cultural Institutions Group”). The CIGs, in addition to receiving
most of the cultural funding from the City, are also a focal point for the City’s CreateNYC
cultural plan (New York City “CreateNYC Action Plan” 2019). The CIGs provide an ideal casestudy to observe the outcomes that a city government may expect from its ownership stake and
funding of public-private cultural partners.
The American Museum of Natural History and the Metropolitan Museum of Art provided
the foundation for the CIG. Membership expanded considerably during the twentieth-century,
amid a city-wide focus on heritage preservation and post-WWII urban redevelopment. Beginning
in the 1960s and 70s, an effort to expand into all five boroughs to provide more equitable access
to arts and culture (Levine 1993, 139; DCLA 2019) resulted in the inclusion of many new
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organizations. By 1980, CIG membership had swelled to 25 members. The latest to join was the
Museum of Jewish Heritage in 1998, while the Weeksville Heritage Center is now poised to
become the first new member in more than 20 years. Figure 8 depicts the current members
(excluding Weeksville) and table 3 summarizes them by borough.

Figure 8. Map of New York City’s Cultural Institutions Group (CIG) Members.

Table 3. Cultural Institutions Group Members by Borough of New York City.
Manhattan

Brooklyn

American Museum of Natural History

Brooklyn Academy of Music

Metropolitan Museum of Art
El Museo del Barrio

Brooklyn Botanic Garden
Brooklyn Children’s Museum

Carnegie Hall

Brooklyn Museum

Queens
Museum of the Moving
Image
MoMA PS 1
Flushing Town Hall
New York Hall of
Science
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Lincoln Center for the Performing
Arts
Museum of the City of New York
Museum of Jewish Heritage
New York City Ballet
New York City Center
Public Theater
Studio Museum in Harlem
The Bronx
Bronx County Historical Society
Bronx Museum of the Arts
New York Botanical Garden
Wave Hill
Wildlife Conservation Society -Bronx
Zoo

Wildlife Conservation SocietyNew York Aquarium

Jamaica Center for Arts
& Learning
Queens Botanical Garden
Queens Museum
Queens Theatre

Staten Island
Staten Island Children’s
Museum
Staten Island Historical
Society
Staten Island Museum
Staten Island Zoological
Society
Snug Harbor Cultural Center
& Botanical Garden

The Mayor has the sole authority to add new institutions to the CIG. Although
membership requires being in a city-owned facility, that is not a sufficient condition, as some
organizations residing in city-owned buildings are not CIG members. The Weeksville Heritage
Center is one such institution, although it has sought membership since it first opened its new
city-owned building in 2013 (Lee 2013). CIG membership typically guarantees a significant
share of the Department of Cultural Affairs (DCLA) annual budget prior to the distribution of
funds to non-CIG arts and culture organizations, though the CIG share of the DCLA budget as
declined from 80% to approximately 60%, even as its membership has expanded (Pogrebin
2017).14

14

The DCLA was established in 1976 but its history predates that, originating as the Office of Cultural
Affairs under Mayor Wagner in 1962. The department’s own recorded history traces its origins to the
original public-private partnership arrangements with the AMNH and Met Museum (New York City,
“Department of Cultural Affairs History”).
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Membership in the CIG does come at some cost, most explicitly in that the city demands
that CIGs operate in a way that honors the goals and directives of the mayor who decides who is
a CIG member and names the Commissioner of the DCLA. Presently those demands can be seen
to include offering free or discounted admissions to holders of the municipal identity card,
IDNYC. The IDNYC initiative is a key component of Mayor de Blasio’s agenda (New York City
“IDNYC 2020”).
Levine describes the funding of DCLA in the 1990s as advancing “strategic mayoral
priorities such as ensuring public safety; preparing our children; promoting economic growth and
opportunities” among others. “DCA is not an arts funder; it is an arm of city government”
(Levine 1993). Currently, Mayor De Blasio has used the DCLA to engage with underserved
communities as a way to further his “tale of two cities” narrative that drove his 2013 election
efforts (New York City 2017).
New York City’s current “CreateNYC” cultural plan is “intended to serve as a roadmap
to a more inclusive, equitable, and resilient cultural ecosystem” (NYC “CreateNYC” 2017). The
plan charges the CIG members to use City resources and funds to move away from the city’s
cultural status quo toward engaging a broader range of the city’s communities. The multi-year
plan is intended to “continue to invest in City-owned cultural assets and the Cultural Institutions
Group (CIG), increasing support for those in low-income communities” This agenda helps to
explain the expansion of the CIGs soon to include the Weeksville Heritage Center. Mayor
DeBlasio aims to spread public arts funding more equitably throughout the city and moves
toward that goal by adding a new CIG within a targeted low-income community. The funding
that flows to CIGs makes them partners willing to engage with this agenda.
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The CIGs represent a fully institutionalized cultural sector within city government. The
group enjoys base-line support from the city budget and can count on a majority of DCLA funds.
New York City, in turn, can use this leverage to get cooperation from these prominent and
influential organizations. It is a symbiotic relationship and one that contains interrelated rules
and routines that often bind behaviors on either side.
This issue of equity of access has been an enduring conundrum for cultural facilities in
New York City and across the United States. In the 1880s, public debate surrounded the question
of whether the Metropolitan Museum of Art should be free to the public on Sundays. Prior to
1891, the Met Museum charged 25-cents Monday and Tuesday, had free admission Wednesday
through Saturday, and was closed on Sundays (Hood 2017, 244). This inherently discriminatory
schedule worked against free access for members of the working class, who generally worked six
days a week with Sunday as their only day to off. The city passed a resolution requiring
institutions situated on public land, and receiving public subsidy, to provide free Sunday access
and no longer “deprive thousands of people of this city who have no other time for visiting said
museums…of recreation and intellectual development these museums were instituted to afford to
all people” (Hood 2017, 244).
Recounting what happed on the first free Sunday on May 31, 1891, Hood tells us “more
than eleven thousand people showed up…Newspapers characterized the visitors as respectable
clerks, salesmen, and workingmen who, despite being longtime city residents, were visiting the
museum for the first time” (Hood 2017, 246.) Further investigation into the reporting of the day
reveals “the grand success” as including women who “came in larger numbers, and almost every
nationality was represented…Smart looking colored women with marvelously decorated male
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companions showed that they appreciated the opportunity to visit the Museum” (New York Times
1891).
Such a tale shows the power of city involvement in the arts being a force for equal access.
This does not ameliorate the challenges and discrimination evident during the period. Elsewhere
in the account relief is expressed that visitors did not include “Essex Street Polish Jews and
Thirty-Ninth Street and Eighth Avenue hod carriers, in ragged clothing and dilapidated hats,”
suggesting all differences were not ignored (New York Times 1891).
Presently, the city has given the Cultural Institutions Group one encompassing mandate,
“provide cultural services accessible to all New Yorkers” (New York City, DCLA 2019). The
1891 Sunday opening of the Met Museum shows that this is not a new request asked of publicprivate cultural institutions. Today it is embedded in the Department of Cultural Affairs’ current
plan, CreateNYC, which seeks to “increase equity in the City’s support for culture, support for
artists and cultural workers from underrepresented groups, and investment in our neighborhoods”
(NYC DCLA 2017).
Boston developed a similar plan starting in 2015 under the name Boston Creates. The
Boston Creates cultural plan does not rely on a public-private partnership, as the city has none to
rely on besides the city-operated Strand Theatre. The Boston Creates plan describes a vibrant yet
fragmented arts and culture sector with inequitable access for residents. The inability for the City
of Boston to implement reforms or set a strong city-wide agenda without additional funding both
stems from the absence of, and may in the future require an increase in, public-private
partnerships. Presently, the City has abandoned its touted BostonCreates.org website and the
domain is currently advertising eyecare products.
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Conclusion
Challenges remain in truly and accurately quantifying local government support for the
arts. Available datasets are subject to varying degrees of participation and differing conceptions
of what qualifies as arts and culture expenditures. Public spending for the arts may be hidden in
many different budget categories, from local arts agencies to the parks department. These
challenges help explain why researchers focus on federal cultural policy spending, which can be
found in one uniform place.
This research into city arts funding has taken initial steps to explore the terra incognita of
government arts policy. By applying a uniform framework for measuring local arts and culture
funding and delving directly into city budget documents for evidence, the result is a reasonably
accurate and consistent assessment of local arts and culture funding for 24 of the largest cities in
America. Additionally, by identifying each city’s ownership stakes in anchor arts facilities, it has
made possible a direct correlation between city-ownership rates and annual local government arts
funding. This one factor explains a significant amount of the variation in local government
support for the arts.
Fully explaining that link will require further study and historical analysis. Kathleen
Thelen, quoting Fritz Scharpf, emphasizes the “ ‘need to have hypotheses that specify a causal
model showing why and how a given constellation of factors could bring about the effect in
question,’ but equally, ‘we need to have empirical evidence that the effect predicted by the
hypothesis is in fact being produced’” (1999). This study has taken beginning steps on that
journey.
The road could be followed in a number of different directions. How true might these
findings be beyond these 24 cities? Also, will these relationships hold true within these 24 cites
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over a sustained research period? What other demographic, economic, or political factors might
be added to the dataset to create multivariate models with even more explanatory power? Time
series data would permit us to understand how the relationships might evolve over time and
assess more precisely whether a city’s addition of new facilities would expand or contract its
budgetary commitments to its cultural sector.
Beyond arts and culture policy, this research demonstrated instances in which city
expenditures can be baked into city budgets, particularly after a one-time capital commitment
evolves into an all-the-time commitment, one that becomes institutionalized within government
bureaucracy. It is not surprising, considering that the very concept of the city is rooted in its
physical place and density, that the physical environment—its buildings and structures—informs
how operating expenditures are made.
Arts and culture will most likely always be considered a non-essential service within city
budgets. But as the current social distancing precautions set upon us by COVD-19 have proven,
the need and want of residents to congregate is immeasurable. Arts and culture provide
opportunities for that, creating shared spaces for ideas and expression. Coinciding with
significant funding levels or not, arts and culture often play a defining role in urban life. How
the arts and culture sector moves forward, and how government plays a part in enhancing and
facilitating it, will remain essential.
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Appendix A: Ownership of Anchor Arts Facilities in 24 American Cities

City

Cultural Organization/Facility

Percentage
of facility
owned by
City
0%

Owner of Facility

Austin, TX

The Contemporary Austin (2 locations)

Austin, TX

The Long Center for the Performing Arts

100%

City

Austin, TX

Film Society of Austin, Inc.

100%

City

Austin, TX

Austin Theatre Alliance (Paramount Theatre & State
Theater)
Zilker Park (Austin Nature Science Center and
Zilker Botanical Garden)
Zachary Scott Theatre Center

0%

Private

100%

City

100%

City

Austin average

67%

Austin, TX
Austin, TX

Private

Boston, MA

Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

0%

Private

Boston, MA

Symphony Hall

0%

Private

Boston, MA

New England Aquarium

0%

Private

Boston, MA

Museum of Science, Boston

0%

Boston, MA

Boston Opera House

0%

Private, ground
lease with State
Private

Boston, MA

The Boch Center

0%

Private

Charlotte, NC

Mint Museum

100%

City

Charlotte, NC

100%

City

Charlotte, NC

Levine Center for the Arts (including Knight
Theater, The Bechtler Museum of Modern Art, Mint
Museum Uptown, and The Harvey B. Gantt Center
for African- American Arts + Culture)
NASCAR Hall of Fame

100%

City

Charlotte, NC

Discovery Place Museums (Science and Nature)

100%

City

Charlotte, NC

Spirit Square (McGlohon Theater & Duke Energy
Theater)
Blumenthal Performing Arts Center (including Belk
Theater, Booth Playhouse, and Stage Door Theater)
Charlotte average

0%

County

100%

City

Chicago, IL

The Art Institute of Chicago

100%

City

Chicago, IL

Field Museum of Natural History

50%

Chicago, IL

Shedd Aquarium

50%

Chicago, IL

Civic Opera House

0%

Ground Lease with
City
Ground Lease with
City
Private

Chicago, IL

Symphony Hall

0%

Private

Chicago, IL

Museum of Science and Industry, Chicago

100%

City

Chicago, IL

Lincoln Park Zoological Gardens

100%

City

Boston average

Charlotte, NC

Chicago average

0%

83%

57%
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Columbus, OH

Columbus Museum of Art

0%

Columbus, OH

Ohio History Connection

0%

State

Columbus, OH

Franklin Park Conservatory and Botanical Gardens

100%

Columbus, OH

Center of Science and Industry

100%

City (in partnership
with County
City

Columbus, OH

Columbus Zoo and Aquarium

100%

City

Columbus, OH

Lincoln Theater

100%

City

Columbus, OH

Ohio Theater

0

Private

Columbus average

Private

57%

Dallas, TX

Dallas Museum of Art

100%

City

Dallas, TX

The AT&T Performing Arts Center

100%

City

Dallas, TX

Dallas Theater Center

100%

City

Dallas, TX

Perot Museum of Nature and Science

100%

City

Dallas, TX

Nasher Sculpture Center

0%

Private

Dallas, TX

The Morton H. Meyerson Symphony Center

100%

City

Denver, CO

Denver Art Museum

50%

Denver, CO

Denver Center for the Performing Arts

100%

Denver, CO

Denver Film Society

Denver, CO

Denver Museum of Nature and Science

100%

Denver, CO

Denver Zoo

100%

Denver, CO

Denver Botanic Gardens

100%

Dallas average

83%
Ground Lease with
City
City

0%

Denver average

75%

Detroit, MI

Detroit Institute of Arts

0%

Private

Detroit, MI

0%

Private

Detroit, MI

Detroit Symphony Orchestra/Max M. Fisher Music
Center
Music Hall Center for the Performing Arts

0%

Private

Detroit, MI

Detroit Opera House

0%

Private

Detroit, MI

Michigan Science Center

0%

Private

Detroit, MI

Detroit Zoo

100%

City

Detroit, MI

Charles H. Wright Museum of African American
History
Detroit average

100%

City

El Paso, TX

El Paso Museum of Art

100%

City

El Paso, TX

El Paso Museum of History

100%

City

El Paso, TX

Plaza Theatre

100%

City

El Paso, TX

El Paso Holocaust Museum and Study Center

0%

Private

El Paso, TX

Abraham Chavez Theater

100%

City

El Paso, TX

The El Paso Zoo

100%

City

El Paso average

29%

83%
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Fort Worth, TX

Fort Worth Museum of Science and History

50%

Fort Worth, TX

Kimbell Art Museum

50%

Fort Worth, TX

Bass Performance Hall

50%

Fort Worth, TX

Amon Carter Museum of American Art

50%

Fort Worth, TX

Fort Worth Museum of Modern Art

0%

Ground Lease with
City
Ground Lease with
City
Ground Lease with
City
Ground Lease with
City
Private

Fort Worth, TX

Fort Worth Zoo

100%

City

Fort Worth, TX

Fort Worth Community Arts Center

100%

City

Houston, TX

Museum of Fine Arts, Houston

0%

Private

Houston, TX

Houston Museum of Natural Science

0%

Private

Houston, TX

The Wortham Theater Center

100%

City

Houston, TX

Houston Zoo

100%

City

Houston, TX

The Hobby Center for the Performing Arts

100%

City

Houston, TX

Jesse H. Jones Hall for the Performing Arts

100%

City

Houston, TX

Miller Outdoor Theater

100%

City

Houston, TX

Alley Theatre

100%

City

Indianapolis, IN

Newfields (Indianapolis Museum of Art)

0%

Private

Indianapolis, IN

0%

Private

Indianapolis, IN

Eiteljorg Museum of American Indians and Western
Art
Indianapolis Art Center

0%

Private

Indianapolis, IN

Indiana Historical Society

0%

Private

Indianapolis, IN

0%

Private

Indianapolis, IN

Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra/Herbert Circle
Theatre
Indiana Repertory Theatre/Indiana Theatre

100%

City

Indianapolis, IN

The Children's Museum of Indianapolis

0%

Private

Fort Worth average

Houston average

Indianapolis average

57%

63%

14%

Jacksonville, FL

Museum of Science and History of Jacksonville

50%

Jacksonville, FL

Times-Union Center for the Performing Arts

100%

Ground Lease with
City
City

Jacksonville, FL

Jacksonville Zoo and Gardens

100%

City

Jacksonville, FL

The Florida Theater

100%

City

Jacksonville, FL

The Cummer Museum of Arts and Gardens

0%

Private

Jacksonville, FL

Museum of Contemporary Art, Jacksonville

0%

University of North
Florida

Los Angeles, CA

Los Angeles County Museum of Art

0%

County

Los Angeles, CA

Performing Arts Center of Los Angeles County

0%

County

Los Angeles, CA

Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History

0%

County

Los Angeles, CA

Getty Center

0%

Private

Los Angeles, CA

The Museum of Contemporary Art (2 venues)

50%

1 venue Private / 1
Venue City

Jacksonville average

58%
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Los Angeles, CA

Los Angeles Zoo and Botanical Gardens

Los Angeles, CA

Skirball Cultural Center
Los Angeles average

Nashville-Davidson,
TN
Nashville-Davidson,
TN
Nashville-Davidson,
TN
Nashville-Davidson,
TN
Nashville-Davidson,
TN
Nashville-Davidson,
TN
Nashville-Davidson,
TN
Nashville-Davidson,
TN

Frist Art Museum

100%

City

0%

Private

21%
100%

City

Tennessee Performing Arts Center

0%

State

Schermerhorn Symphony Center

0%

Private

100%

City

Cheekwood Botanical Garden and Museum of Art

0%

Private

The Country Music Hall of Fame and Museum

0%

Private

Nashville Zoo at Grassmere

50%

Tennessee State Museum

0%

Ground Lease with
City
State

The Parthenon

Nashville-Davidson average

31%

New York City, NY

Metropolitan Museum of Art

100%

City

New York City, NY

American Museum of Natural History

100%

City

New York City, NY

Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts

100%

City

New York City, NY

Bronx Zoo

100%

City

New York City, NY

Carnegie Hall

100%

City

New York City, NY

The New York Botanical Garden

100%

City

New York City, NY

Museum of Modern Art

0%

Private

New York City, NY

Brooklyn Academy of Music

100%

City

New York City average

88%

Philadelphia, PA

Philadelphia Museum of Art

100%

Philadelphia, PA

Kimmel Center for the Performing Arts

0%

Private

Philadelphia, PA

The Philadelphia Zoo

50%

Philadelphia, PA

The Museum of the American Revolution

0%

Ground Lease with
City
Private

Philadelphia, PA

Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts

0%

Private

Philadelphia, PA

The Franklin Institute

0%

Private

Philadelphia, PA

The Mann Center for the Performing Arts

Philadelphia, PA

The Academy of Music
Philadelphia average

City

100%

City

0%

Private

31%

Phoenix, AZ

Phoenix Art Museum

100%

City

Phoenix, AZ

Phoenix Zoo

50%

Phoenix, AZ

Musical Instrument Museum

0%

Ground Lease with
City
Private

Phoenix, AZ

Desert Botanical Garden

50%

Phoenix, AZ

Heard Museum

0%

Ground Lease with
City
Private

Phoenix, AZ

Symphony Hall

100%

City
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Phoenix, AZ

Arizona Science Center

Phoenix, AZ

Herberger Theater Center
Phoenix average

100%

City

100%

City

63%

Portland, OR

Portland Art Museum

Portland, OR

Portland'5 Centers for the Arts

Portland, OR

Portland Center Stage at The Armory

Portland, OR

The Oregon Museum of Science and Industry

0%

Private

Portland, OR

Portland Children's Museum

100%

Portland, OR

Oregon Zoo

100%

Ground Lease with
City
City

Portland average

0%

Private

100%

City

0%

Private

50%

San Antonio, TX

San Antonio Museum of Art

0%

San Antonio, TX

The Witte Museum

100%

City

San Antonio, TX

The DoSeum (The San Antonio Children's Museum)

0%

Private

San Antonio, TX

The McNay Art Museum

0%

Private

San Antonio, TX

San Antonio Zoo

50%

San Antonio, TX

Brisco Western Art Museum

0%

Ground Lease with
City
Private

San Antonio, TX

The Tobin Center for the Performing Arts

0%

Private

San Antonio average

Private

21%

San Diego, CA

San Diego Museum of Art

100%

City

San Diego, CA
San Diego, CA

Joan and Irwin Jacobs Music Center
San Diego Natural History Museum

0%
100%

Private
City

San Diego, CA

The Old Globe

50%

San Diego, CA

San Diego Zoo

100%

Ground Lease with
City
City

San Diego, CA

San Diego Theatres (Civic Theatre and Balboa
Theatre)
San Diego average

100%

City

Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco (M. H. de
Young Memorial Museum and Legion of Honor)
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art

100%

City

0%

Private

100%

City

San Francisco, CA

San Francisco War Memorial and Performing Arts
Center
Asian Art Museum

100%

City

San Francisco, CA

San Francisco Zoo

100%

City

San Francisco, CA

California Academy of Sciences

100%

City

San Francisco, CA

Exploratorium

100%

City

San Francisco, CA

Yerba Buena Center for the Arts

100%

City via
Redevelopment
Agency

San Francisco, CA
San Francisco, CA
San Francisco, CA

San Francisco average

75%

88%
100%

City

San Jose, CA

San Jose Museum of Art
San Jose Children's Discovery Museum

100%

City

San Jose, CA

California Theater

100%

City

San Jose, CA
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San Jose, CA
San Jose, CA
San Jose, CA

San Jose Center for the Performing Arts and
Montgomery Theater
Tech Museum of Innovation
The Computer History Museum
San Jose average

Seattle, WA

100%

City

100%

City

0%

Private

83%
33%

Private/City/Private

Seattle, WA

Seattle Art Museum/Asian Art Museum/Olympic
Sculpture Park
Benaroya Hall

100%

City

Seattle, WA

Seattle Center (Multiple Venues)

100%

City

Seattle, WA

Seattle Aquarium

100%

City

Seattle, WA

Museum of Pop Culture

0%

City

Seattle, WA

Woodland Park Zoo

100%

City

Seattle, WA

Seattle Theatre Group (Paramount, Moore and
Neptune Theatres)
Seattle average

0%

Private

62%
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Appendix B: Budget Sources for Fiscal Year 2017 Expenditures
City of Austin, 2016/2017 Approved Budget Volume One and Two
https://assets.austintexas.gov/budget/16-17/downloads/Approved_Volume_1_FINAL.pdf
https://assets.austintexas.gov/budget/16-17/downloads/Approved_Volume_2_FINAL.pdf
City of Boston, Fiscal Year 2017 Adopted Budget, Summary Budget and Fiscal Year 2017
Adopted Budget, Arts and Culture
https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/embed/file/201610/02_adotped_summary_budget.pdf
https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/embed/file/201610/04_arts_culture_cabinet.pdf
City of Charlotte, FY 2017 Strategic Operating Plan and FY 2017 – FY 2021 Community
Investment Plan
https://charlottenc.gov/budget/Documents/FY2017%20Strategic%20Operating%20Plan.p
df
City of Chicago, Annual Appropriation Ordinance for Year 2017 and The Chicago Park District
Budget Appropriations
https://chicityclerk.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/document_uploads/budget/2017/2017_Annual_Appropriation_Ordinance.pdf
https://assets.chicagoparkdistrict.com/s3fspublic/documents/page/2017_BUDGET_APPROPRIATIONS_0.pdf
City of Columbus, 2017 Operating Budget and Greater Columbus Arts Council, 2017 GCAC
Annual Report
https://www.columbus.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147491726
http://annualreport.gcac.org/2017/#toggle-id-15
City of Dallas, Annual Budget for Fiscal Year 2016-2017 as Approved on September 21, 2016 by
the Honorable Mayor and Members of the Dallas City Council
https://dallascityhall.com/departments/budget/financialtransparency/AnnualBudget/FY20
1617-AdoptedBudgetBook.pdf
City and County of Denver, Mayor’s 2017 Budget
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/344/documents/Budget/2017/
Mayors_2017_Budget.pdf
City of Detroit, FY 2017 - 2020 Four Year Plan - Section C - Legal Budget
https://detroitmi.gov/document/fy-2017-2020-four-year-plan-section-c-legal-budget
City of El Paso: Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Adopted by City Council August 23, 2016
https://www.elpasotexas.gov/~/media/files/coep/office%20of%20management%20and%
20budget/fy17%20budget/fy17%20adopted%20budget%20book.ashx?la=en
City of Fort Worth, FY2017 Adopted Annual Budget and Program Objectives
https://fortworthtexas.gov/budget/fy2017/full/
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City of Houston, Adopted Operating Budget for the Period July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017 and
Mayors Office of Cultural Affairs, Grants and Funding FY 2017
https://houstontx.gov/budget/17budadopt/FY2017_Adopted_Budget.pdf
https://www.houstontx.gov/culturalaffairs/grants-and-funding.html
City of Indianapolis, 2017 Adopted Budget for the Consolidated City of Indianapolis Marion
County and 2017 Proposed Budget
https://xmaps.indy.gov/ODP/Download/OFM/Budget/Adopted/2017%20Adopted%20Bu
dget.pdf
https://xmaps.indy.gov/ODP/Download/OFM/Budget/Proposed/2017%20Proposed%20B
udget.pdf
City of Jacksonville, Adopted Annual Budget Fiscal Year 2016 – 2017
https://www.coj.net/departments/finance/docs/budget/fy16-17-annual-budget.aspx
City of Los Angeles, Budget Fiscal Year 2016-2017, Modified and Adopted by The Council
https://lacontroller.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Budget-2016-17.pdf
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Operating Budget for Fiscal
Year 2016-2017
https://www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/Finance/docs/OMB/FY17budget/Final/F
Y2017FinalBudgetBook.pdf
City of New York, Adopted Budget Fiscal Year 2017, Expense Revenue Contract
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/erc6-16.pdf
City of Philadelphia, The Mayor’s Operating Budget in Brief for the Fiscal Year 2017 as
Approved by the Council – June 2016
https://www.phila.gov/finance/pdfs/FY17FinalBudgetinBriefAdopted.pdf
City of Phoenix, Citywide Inventory of Programs 2016-17 Adopted Budget and 2017-18
Preliminary Estimate https://www.phoenix.gov/budgetsite/budget-books/Inventory-ofPrograms-2016-17.pdf
City of Portland Oregon, Adopted Budget Fiscal 2016-17 Volume One and Two
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/cbo/article/583311
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/cbo/article/583313
City of San Antonio, Adopted Operating and Capital Budget, 2017
https://www.sanantonio.gov/portals/0/files/budget/fy2017/FY2017FinalAdoptedBudget.p
df
City of San Diego, Adopted Budget, FY: 2017 Budget Overview and Schedules, Volume 1
https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/fy17_adopted_budget_-_full.pdf
City and County of San Francisco, Budget and Appropriation Ordinance, Fiscal Year ending
June 30, 2016 and Fiscal Year ending June 30, 2017
http://openbook.sfgov.org/webreports/details3.aspx?id=2182
City of San Jose, 2016-2017 Adopted Budget
https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showdocument?id=50021
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City of Seattle, 2017 Adopted and 2018 Endorsed Budget
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/FinanceDepartment/17adoptedbudget/2
017adoptedbudgetbook.pdf
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